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I. INTRODUCTION
L OCAL GOVERNMENTS, in an era of urban crisis, have become
enmeshed in the problem of finding resources for their pressing
financial needs.' The costs of providing public services have spi-
raled, far outstripping the ability of traditional revenue-producing
sources to generate new income.2  There are many reasons for this
rise in costs, including inflation,3 the expansion of municipal ser-
vices,4 and even civil disorders.5 But regardless of the causes, it is
evident that the traditional revenue producer - the property tax
- is in most cases no longer able to support services of the breadth
and scope needed in the modern municipality.
Both inherent limitations and flaws in application contribute to
the property tax's inability to adequately support a large urban gov-
ernment.6 It is generally recognized that the administration of the
property tax leaves much to be desired.' Diverse exemptions, incom-
plete rolls, and high administration costs are the predominate com-
plaints. 8 In Ohio, the requirement of statewide uniformity in assess-
1 See generally J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 11-12 (3d ed.
1970); Hartman, Municipal Income Taxation, 31 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 123 (1959).
2 See Bradford, Malt & Oates, The Rising Costs of Local Public Services: Some Evi-
dence and Reflections, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 185 (1969).
During the past decade alone, municipal employment has increased 65 percent.
Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1970, at 1, col. 5 (Midwest ed.).
One author has attributed the growth of public expenditures to three factors: (1) a
general tendency for increased scope of government to accompany rising income levels,
(2) a wage rollout effect from the private to the public sector, increasing wage demands,
and (3) the labor intensive public sector's requiring greater physical input for each
unit of physical output than the capital intensive private sector. Bahl, State Taxes, Ex-
penditures and the Fiscal Plight of the Cities, in THE STATES AND THE URBAN
CRISIS 85,93 (A. Campbell ed. 1970).
3 See Hartman, supra note 1, at 123.
4 See Gotherman, Development of the Income Tax in Ohio, 18 OHIO CrrES &
VILLAGES, July 1970, at 7.
5 See Note, An Evaluation of Municipal Income Taxation, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1313
(1969).
6 See, e.g., Netzer, The Property Tax Case for Federal Tax Sharing, in STATE AND
LOCAL TAX PROBLEMS 88, 88-92 (H. Johnson ed. 1969).
7 See R. SIGAFOoS, THE MUNICIPAL INCOME TAX: ITS HISTORY AND ITS PROB-
LEMS 145 (1955); Becker, Property Tax Problems Confronting State and Lopal Govern-
ments, in STATE AND LOCAL TAX PROBLEMS 34, 35 (H. Johnson ed. 1969).
8 See R. SIGAFOOS, supra note 7, at 145. For a detailed discussion of some of the
defects in the property tax, see Lynn, Reform of Property Tax Systems, in STATE AND
LOCAL TAX PROBLEMS 23 (H. Johnson ed. 1969).
MUNICIPAL INCOME TAXATION
ment between private and commercial property places an excessive
burden on individual, residential property owners.9 Furthermore,
the burden of property taxation escapes both the nonresident who
works in the city and the resident who does not own property. The
property owner justifiably complains of having to bear an inordinate
share of municipal revenue funding. In the search for a solution
to the problem of revenue raising, municipal income taxation has
loomed as an answer which is both politically and economically
feasible.' 0
A properly administered municipal income tax has proved itself
capable of sufficiently supplementing the revenue produced by prop-
erty taxes." In cities with numerous large-scale employers, the tax
9 In State ex rel. Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175 Ohio St. 410,
195 N.E.2d 908 (1964), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Board of Tax Appeals
has the statutory duty to insure that the county auditor assesses both private and com-
mercial property uniformly.
In the second Park Investment case, State ex rel. Park Investment Co. v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 16 Ohio St. 2d 85, 242 N.E.2d 887 (1968), the court held that the Board
of Tax Appeals was required to promulgate rules to insure that all real property within
the state is assessed at a uniform percentage of its true money value. The Park Invest-
ment II court also held that the Board was required to establish an equal and uniform
statewide rule for the determination of the taxable value of real property. By requiring
all counties to assess at the same rate, the Supreme Court of Ohio has severely restricted
the needed flexibility in county revenue collection. See 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 147
(1969).
10 See Walker, The Inevitability of City Income Taxes, 34 TAX POLICY 3 (1967),
where the author concludes: "Despite certain aberrant examples, there is reason to be-
lieve that the flat rate income tax will continue to spread throughout the large cities.
This will happen not because of any enthusiasm for the tax, but because it is extra-
ordinarily productive, administratively feasible, and preserves local autonomy." Id. at
3. See also Bahl, supra note 2, at 96. Some authors, however, have not seen the munici-
pal income tax as a feasible alternative. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, THE PUBLIC FINANCES
442 (rev. ed. 1965), where the author observes that incomes are earned in the whole
economy. Thus, municipal income taxation gives rise to both interstate competition for
taxable business resources and a conflict between municipalities of residence and munic-
ipalities of employment in the taxation of individuals. The author concludes that the
taxation of income should be the exclusive province of the federal government. For
other problems with the local income tax, see text accompanying notes 16-19 infra.
31 For example, in ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
THE COMMUTER AND THE MUNICIPAL INCOME TAX (1970) [hereinafter cited as
ADVISORY CoMM'N], the following 1967-1968 figures are listed for the major Ohio
cities:
Percent of income tax
City to total tax collections
Akron 51.3
Cincinnati 42.2
Cleveland 14.1
Columbus 71.8
Toledo 65.6
Youngstown 70.7
Id., table 2, at 10-11. It has been suggested that the municipal income tax has been so
successful that it can be considered a substitute rather than a supplemental source of
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is easily administered because the bulk of collections are made at
the places of employment. 12 It provides an effective means of secur-
ing financial support for the central city from suburban residents
working within the city.'" In addition, residents who do not own
property are required to contribute to the city's support. Finally, be-
cause it is directly correlated to corporate and individual incomes,
it is responsive to inflationary trends.' 4 The municipal income tax
provides an answer to many of the revenue-raising problems cur-
rently facing the nation's cities. 15
A municipal income tax, however, is not without its drawbacks.
Just as an income tax is responsive to inflationary trends, it is also
affected by recessions. 16 Widely fluctuating revenue patterns place a
burden on the financial planners of a city in budgeting for the
future. Most city budgets are geared to the relatively stable, albeit
inadequate, revenue produced by property taxation. The problem
of incomes fluctuating with the economy does not appear to be intol-
erable, however, because many municipal current operating expendi-
tures should decrease during recessionary periods. Other major
drawbacks of municipal income taxes include the effect of strikes on
both personal and business incomes,' 8 geographic limitations on fiscal
authority,'9 and legislative limitations which restrict to generally in-
adequate levels the ceiling rate which may be imposed in the absence
of voter approval.
In Ohio, state regulation of local income taxation is accom-
plished through the Uniform Municipal Income Tax Act.20  Enacted
revenue. Deran, Tax Structure in Cities Using the Income Tax, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 147,
152 (1968). See generally R. SIGAFOOs, supra note 7, at 145-46.
'2 Masotti & Kugelman, The Municipal Income Tax as an Approach to the Urban
Fiscal Crisis, 45 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 113, 122 (1967). Administration of the tax can
be further facilitated through use of a central collection agency. See Cook, Effects, Prob-
lems, and Solutions of Central Collection of Municipal Income Taxes, 19 CASE W. RES.
L REV. 900 (1968).
13 Walker, supra note 10, at 6.
14 Masotti & Kugelman, supra note 12, at 115.
15 To date, however, only nine states have municipalities currently administering an
income tax: Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 11, table 2, at 10-11. For a
general discussion of some of the problems municipalities have encountered in this area,
including state constitutional prohibitions and the judicially created preemption by im-
plication doctrine (whereby state enactment of a tax precludes the municipalities from
taxing the same source), see Note, supra note 5, at 1332-59.
16 Masotti & Kugelman, supra note 12, at 115.
17 See generally Hartman, supra note 1, at 123-24.
18 See Masotti & Kugelman, supra note 12, at 115.
1 9 See J. BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 442.
2 0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 718.01-.06 (Page Supp. 1970).
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in 1957, the Act was an attempt by the General Assembly to bring
some uniformity and regulation into a previously unrestricted area.21
Since 1957, however, some of the Act's restrictions have become un-
duly limiting upon municipalities. The purpose of this Note is to
propose several changes in the Uniform Municipal Income Tax Act.
These changes will permit a greater production of revenue and
establish a more equitable tax structure for the taxpayer. The Note
will discuss the following: existing limitations on a municipality's
power to tax income; classifications of taxpayers and incomes; resi-
dency, credit systems, and reciprocity; and the right of nonresident
taxpayers to vote in elections to increase the income tax rate.
II. MUNICIPAL INCOME TAXATION IN OHIO
A. Power of Municipalities to Tax Income
The right of Ohio municipalities to levy taxes was judicially es-
tablished in State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 2 38 years before en-
actment of the Uniform Municipal Income Tax Act. In Carrel,
Cincinnati had levied an occupational tax upon certain businesses,
trades, vocations, and professions. There was no express constitu-
tional authorization granting a city the right to levy such a tax, but
the Ohio Supreme Court found an implied power to tax under the
state constitution's grant to municipalities of the power of local self-
government.23  The court reasoned that the power of local self-
government includes "the power of taxation, for without this power
local government in cities could not exist for a day."2 Inherent in
the power of any sovereign must be the revenue-collecting powers to
finance services which private parties are either disinclined to or
21 See Glander, The Uniform Municipal Income Tax Act, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 489,
490-91 (1957).
22 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
2 3 O o CONST. art. XVIII, § 3, sets forth the basic grant of home rule powers. It
provides: "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-govern-
ment and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." Section 7 of the same arti-
cle adds that: "Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a charter for its govern-
ment and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this artide, exercise thereunder
all powers of local self-government."
The Supreme Court of Ohio, after some initial confusion, has stated that section 3 is
self-executing, and that the powers of local self-government may be executed by both
charter and noncharter municipalities. Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio
St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923). Although the full extent of the home rule powers has
yet to be defined, it is clear that the power of taxation is a substantive power of local
self-government which may be exercised by both charter and noncharter municipalities.
See 3 J. FARRELL, 011O MUNICIPAL CODE 348 (11th ed. 1962).
24 99 Ohio St. at 227, 124 N.E. at 136.
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cannot perform. The court was sensitive, however, to an overly
broad reading of the powers of local self-government and added that
the power to tax was subject to the guidance of legislative restric-
tions imposed by the General Assembly.-
Although no legislative restrictions existed at the time of the
Carrel decision, the court, in dictum, noted that local governments
were impliedly restricted from enacting either an inheritance or an
income tax.2" This implication was derived from specific provisions
of the Ohio constitution which authorize the state to levy both in-
come and inheritance taxes.27 The court felt that this constitutional
grant of power to the state precluded local governments from tax-
ing in these areas.
The Carrel dictum remained unchallenged until after World War
II, when municipalities were forced to adopt measures to supple-
ment revenues being produced by the property tax. Exigencies such
as much needed improvements which had been postponed during
the war and a population explosion necessitated increased revenues
and services.2 In 1946, the city of Toledo enacted an ordinance
which provided for the assessment and collection of an income
tax.
In Angell v. City of Toledo,29 an action was brought to test the
validity of the Toledo ordinance. The Ohio Supreme Court swept
away the Carrel dictum and upheld the power of municipalities to
tax incomes. The power of taxation was again found to be a funda-
mental power of local self-government, subject to the rights of limi-
tation and restriction given to the General Assembly by the constitu-
tion.30 In the years between Angell and the enactment of the
Uniform Municipal Income Tax Act, Ohio municipalities took this
25 Id., 124 N.E. at 136.
26 Id. at 228, 124 N.E. at 136.
2T OHIO CONST. art. XII, §§ 7-8.
28 Gotherman, supra note 4, at 7.
29 153 Ohio St. 179,91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
30 OHIO CoNsT. art. XII, § 6, provides "The General Assembly shall provide for
the organization of cities, and incorporated villages, by general laws, and restrict their
power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their
credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such power." OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 13 pro-
vides in part: "Laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes and
incur debts for local purposes ...." Although these two constitutional provisions are
ostensibly directed at different problems, most commentators feel that each grants the
same power to the General Assembly to restrict municipal taxation. See, e.g., Fordham
& Mallison, Local Income Taxation, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 217, 227 (1950).
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newly implied right to heart and enacted broad and diverse taxing
ordinances. 3
B. Restrictions on a Municipality's Power to Tax Income
1. Requirement of Electorate Approval to Increase the Tax
Rate to Over 1 Percent.- In 1957 the Uniform Act was passed under
the General Assembly's constitutional authority to restrict and
limit a municipality's power to tax. 2  The Uniform Act was an at-
tempt to control the diverse ordinances that were enacted following
the Angell decision.-' But the Uniform Act has cut too deeply into
the broad power of local self-government which was inferred from
article XVIII, section 3 of the constitution,34 and severely limits
municipalities in a fundamental function. A recently amended por-
tion of the Act presents the most severe limitation on the munici-
pality's power to raise revenue. It provides:
No municipal corporation shall levy a tax on income at a rate in
excess of one percent without having obtained the approval of such
excess by a majority of the electors of such municipality voting on
the question at a general or primary election and at least fifty-five
percent at a special election .... 5
The Act also provides that no municipal corporation shall tax "at
other than a uniform rate."3'  The Act contains other limitations,37
but the above are the most significant for the purposes of this Note.
The requirement of electorate approval for an increase of the
municipal tax above the 1 percent ceiling has long been considered
a restriction. 8 It severely limits the revenue available to the munic-
31 Glander, supra note 21, at 490-91.
3 2 OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 6; id. art. XVIII, § 13; see note 30 supra.
33 See Glander, supra note 21, at 490-91.
84See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
35 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page Supp. 1970).
36Id.
37 The Act limits the use of revenue produced by a levy in excess of the 1 percent
limit to the "specified purpose" stated in the ballot. Id. Whether this provision con-
stitutes a restriction depends on how broadly the municipality is permitted to state its
specified purpose. For example, if "for use in the general operating budget," is a spe-
cific enough purpose, there is no meaningful restriction on the use of the new funds.
But if courts equate this provision with the "one purpose" provision for which proceeds
from certain bond elections may be used (see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 133.10 (Page
1953) ), the use of newly authorized tax revenue will be greatly restricted.
The Act prohibits the taxing of military pay and allowances and income from tax ex-
empt property or activities of religious, fraternal, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional institutions. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page Supp. 1970. This limitation
does not appear to have had any serious effect on tax revenues. Cf. Glander, supra note
21, at 493.
38 Glander, supra note 21, at 492.
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ipality and restricts the flexibility of city planners in providing neces-
sary services which would require funding above the revenue avail-
able at that level. An increase in the ceiling above its present level
is necessary to meet expanding municipal revenue needs. It might
be argued that the 1 percent ceiling is a necessary restriction because
the required vote places the local taxpayers in direct control of any
unwarranted or substantial increase in a municipality's taxing power.
Although raising the ceiling may make revenue collection less re-
sponsive to the views of the taxpayer, 39 the electorate would still
retain indirect control over the tax rate through its power to elect
local officials. Many of these local officials have short terms of of-
fice, making them very sensitive to voter opinion. In addition, the
local electorate would still retain direct control over any attempts to
set the rate above the level of the new ceiling.
2. Legislative Preemption.-Another state restriction on a mu-
nicipality's power to tax is presented by the doctrine of preemption.
Preemption, either express or implied, occurs when the state's
entrance into an area of taxation precludes the municipalities from
taxing in that area. The General Assembly might expressly state
that it intends to preclude local governments from using the area
as a revenue source, or it might remain silent, impliedly preempting
the area and leaving the exact boundaries of the preclusion to judi-
cial interpretation." The Ohio General Assembly has not as yet en-
acted a state income tax; nonetheless, it is important to anticipate
the preemptive effect which an Ohio income tax, if enacted, might
have on its municipal counterparts.
There have been judicial pronouncements which indicate that the
General Assembly may have the power to expressly preempt the area
of income taxation. In Haefner v. City of Youngstown,41 the Su-
39 Electorate dissatisfaction is often high in the early stages of the tax, but hostility
towards the tax tends to become mollified after the tax has been in existence for a period
of time. R. SIGAFOOS, supra note 7, at 36-37.
40 See Glander & Dewey, Municipal Taxation - A Study of the Pre-Emption Doc-
trine, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 72, 75-81 (1948).
Municipalities in one state have avoided implied preemption merely by giving their
tax a different name. Kentucky municipalities label their tax on incomes an occupational
license tax. It is imposed on salaries, wages, commissions, or other compensation earned
by a person working within the taxing jurisdiction, and the net profits of businesses,
trades, professions, or occupations from activities conducted within the jurisdiction. KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 91.200, 92.281 (Baldwin 1969). In reality this is an income tax,
and it was felt that the state income tax may have preempted the field. The Supreme
Court of Kentucky approved of this shallow guise of classification by labels. See Sims
v. Board of Educ., 290 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1956); Kohler v. Benckarr, 252 S.W.2d 854
(Ky. 1952); City of Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948).
41 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
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preme Court of Ohio held that a municipal tax on consumers of util-
ities, based on the price of the services received, was impliedly pre-
empted by a state tax on retail sales and gross receipts of utility
companies. The court stated in dictum that article XVIII, section
13 of the constitution, which allows the legislature to limit munici-
pal taxation for local purposes, provides the General Assembly with
the power to expressly preclude a municipality from levying any
tax. In fact, the court felt that this power would exist even with-
out the above constitutional provision, presumably because article II,
section 1 gives the General Assembly all general legislative powers,
which include taxation powers. It is questionable, however, whether
the legislature could completely frustrate a municipality in the exer-
cise of its powers of local self-government by depriving the munici-
pality of its revenue sources.'
A more immediate problem than express preemption is the judi-
cial doctrine of implied preemption. An illustration of this doctrine
occurred in East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Akron," where the Supreme
Court of Ohio struck down a municipal income tax on the net in-
come of a public utility on the ground that the state had impliedly
preempted the field by extracting a gross receipts tax on public util-
ities 5 The court, following the long Ohio judicial history of im-
plied preemption, stated that a judicial policy exists against levying
concurrent taxes on the same source .4
More germane to municipal income taxation is the state's implied
preemption of a tax on income generated by intangible property. In
Ohio Finance Co. v. City of Toledo,47 the issue was whether Toledo
was precluded from taxing the investment income of dealers in in-
tangibles. The Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously agreed that the
42Id. at 61, 68 N.E.2d at 65. The Ohio court did not go as far as the Supreme
Court of Colorado in City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441
(1958), where it was held that mere constitutional authorization for the state legislature
to enact a state income tax preempted municipalities from levying such a tax. (Article
XII, section 8 of the Ohio constitution authorizes the General Assembly to enact a state
income tax. See text accompanying note 86 infra.) See also Hartman, supra note 1, at
143-48.
43 The interplay between the home rule provisions (see note 23 supra) and the
constitutional provisions authorizing the General Assembly to restrict municipalities'
power of taxation (see note 30 supra) has been analyzed, with the conclusion that the
General Assembly retains ultimate control over taxation. Fordham & Asher, Home
Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 18, 26 n.30 (1948).
44 7 Ohio St. 2d 73,218 N.E.2d 608 (1966).
45 See OHiO REV. CoDE ANN. § 5727.38 (Page Supp. 1970).
46"Double taxation [however) is primarily a policy consideration, not a legal con-
sideration .... ." Glander, Analysis and Critique of State Pre-Emption of Municipal
Excise and Income Taxes Under Ohio Home Rule, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 343, 358 (1960).
47 163 Ohio St. 81, 125 NE.2d 731 (1955).
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Ohio intangibles tax impliedly preempted the municipality from tax-
ing the ordinary taxpayer on his investment income. Dealers in in-
tangibles, however, are exempted from the state intangibles tax.48
Thus, the municipality argued that it was not preempted from taxing
the net profits of the plaintiff dealer which were derived from its in-
come producing intangibles.
In a four to three decision, the court held that Toledo was pre-
cluded from taxing the plaintiff's net profits from intangibles. The
owners of shares of dealers in intangibles are taxed on the fair value
of their shares.49  The majority pointed to this fact as evidence that
the legislature did not intend the owners of shares of dealers to pay
less tax than the owners of other intangibles. The majority then
cited section 5414-3 of the Ohio General Code, which provided in
part: "The real estate of a dealer in intangibles shall be taxed in the
place where it is located ... but the tax provided for in this chapter
shall be in lieu of all other taxes on the other property and assets
used in the business of such a dealer."5  The majority deemed the
tax upon a dealer's shareholders to constitute a tax upon the dealer,
and reasoned that section 5414-3 evidenced a legislative "intent that
no tax should be imposed on the income which a dealer in intangi-
bles receives from the intangibles that he owns."'" This express
intention precluded a municipality from taxing that income just as
a state tax on the income would preempt the municipality from taxing
it.
The dissent read section 5414-3 as only relieving a dealer in in-
tangibles from paying state property taxes and relieving its share-
holders from paying taxes usually required of ordinary investors; it
should not be read as prohibiting a municipal income tax on the net
profits of a dealer in intangibles. The dissent then pointed out that
the state tax on the fair value of the shares of a dealer was purely
a property tax; thus, it should not impliedly preempt the municipal-
ity from exacting an income tax from a dealer. The dissent felt
that the doctrine of implied preemption should be confined to situa-
tions "where both the state and the municipality have imposed the
same or a similar tax on the same taxpayer. 52
4 8 See OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5711.01(B) (Page 1953).
49 Id. §§ 5725.13, 5707.03(D).
50163 Ohio St. at 84, 125 N.E.2d at 733 (emphasis added by the court). The
relevant language of section 5414-3 is now found in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5725.26
(Page 1953).
51 163 Ohio St. at 86, 125 N.E.2d at 733.
52 Id. at 89, 125 N.E.2d at 735.
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The existence of the doctrine of implied preemption in a state
with a tradition of strong and independent home rule municipal-
ities has been widely criticized.53  The major grounds of criticism
have been (1) that no inference can be made from the Ohio con-
stitution to support the doctrine, (2) that it is not essential to the
state's maintenance of its sovereignty, and (3) that if the General
Assembly should decide to enact a state income tax, the municipal-
ities will be denied yet another source of revenue.
Despite the potential onerousness of the doctrine, it has not
yet presented a serious problem to municipal income taxation in
Ohio.54 That the doctrine has not been a burden in the past, how-
ever, does not provide assurance that it will not be so in the future.
Obviously the need for additional revenue is not merely local,5 and
the adoption of a state income tax in the near future is quite likely.5"
If the state does adopt an income tax, it is constitutionally bound
to return at least 50 percent of the amount collected to the political
subdivision in which the tax revenue originates.57 But it would be
difficult for a state tax to accommodate the municipalities' need for
flexibility. Presently, Ohio municipal income tax rates vary from
1/4 of 1 percent to 1.7 percent.58 Under a uniform state tax rate,
53 Fordham & Mallison, supra note 30, at 232-33; Glander, supra note 46, at 343;
Glander & Dewey, supra note 40, at 72; Gotherman, supra note 4, at 8; Note, supra
note 5, at 1335-48.
5 4 See Hartman, supra note 1, at 143-46. See Glander & Dewey, supra note 40, at
74, for a survey of the potential effects of the doctrine on municipal excise taxes.
455 See, e.g., THE COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1970-
1971, at 198 (1970).
56 OHIO TAX STUDY COMM'N, COMIISSION REPORT: THE STATE AND LOCAL
TAx STRUCTURE IN OHIO at xi (1967); The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Oct. 7,
1970, § C, at 5, col. 1.
5 7 OHIO CONsT. art XII, § 9, provides:
Not less than fifty per centum of the income and inheritance taxes that may
be collected by the state shall be returned to the county, school district, city,
village or township in which said income or inheritance originates, or to any of
the same, as may be provided by law.
The treatment of the state inheritance tax provides some guidelines for the applica-
tion of this section to an income tax. The political subdivision receives 50 percent of
the gross amount of taxes levied and paid. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5731A8 (Page
Supp. 1970). The collection expenses are assessed against the state's percentage, id.
§ 5731.47, including the compensation of the tax commissioner. 68 OP. ATE'Y GEN.
(OHIO) 115 (1968). Analogy to the inheritance tax is inappropriate, however, to de-
termine where the income tax "originates." If, for example, the place of employment,
rather than place of residence, is considered the originating jurisdiction, many suburbs
will be deprived of a substantial source of income now available under reciprocity agree-
ments. See text accompanying note 134-38 infra.
5 8 Cincinnati has the 1.7 percent rate. 2 CCH STATE TAx REP., O1o 5 71-305.01,
at 7071 (1970). The lowest rate, 1/4 of 1 percent, is levied by Cuyahoga Heights and
Evendale. Id. 5 71-150, at 7026-27. For a list of rates in all Ohio cities of less than
100,000 population, see 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., OHIO 5 71-150, at 7021-44 (1970).
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some municipalities would receive too little revenue while others
would receive too much.
One solution to the problem of implied preemption in the in-
come tax area was contained in a bill recently introduced in the Ohio
House of Representatives.5" The product of a study by the Biparti-
san Select Committee on Tax Revision,6" the bill attempts to solve
the problem of providing the state with a comprehensive revenue
system, without completely usurping municipal control over income
taxation. Basically, the compromise reached is to have the state
exclusively tax incorporated and unincorporated businesses at 5 per-
cent of their net income "derived from sources within the state,'' 61
while a Local Government Income Tax (LGIT) collected at the
county level, with a state-controlled 1 percent rate, would be levied
on the income of estates and trusts and on the adjusted gross income,
as determined for federal income tax purposes, derived from indi-
vidual personal service compensation.6" In addition, to accom-
modate the municipalities' need for autonomy and flexibility, the
bill would allow municipalities to piggyback their own income tax
onto the LGIT.6 3 The taxpayer could credit the amount he pays
on the piggyback tax against the amount he is required to pay under
the LGIT.
There are, however, restrictions on this piggyback tax. First, the
municipal tax must be levied at a flat rate.64 Second, the munic-
ipalities must use the state formulated definitions of income for in-
dividuals, estates, and trusts. 65  Third, the ceiling rate on the piggy-
back tax would be 1/2 of 1 percent, although this could be raised
by voter approval.66 At no time, however, could a municipality col-
5 9 H.B. 446, 108th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess., § 1 (1969-1970). The bill was introduced
into the Ohio House of Representatives by State Representative Albert H. Sealy, and is
commonly referred to as the "Sealy Bill." For an extensive analysis of the bill, see
Note, The Limits of Municipal Income Taxation: The Response in Ohio, 7 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 271, 281-93 (1970). The bill was indefinitely postponed by the House Ways
and Means Committee on September 11, 1970.
60 See BIPARTISAN SELEcT COMM. ON TAX REVISION, FINAL REPORT TO THE
OHIO HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 107th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess. (1967-1968) (Nov.
21, 1968). Much of the research and statistical investigation was conducted by the
Battelle Memorial Institute. BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, REPORT ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAx REVISION IN OHIo (1968).
6 1H.B. 446, 108th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess., § 1 (1969-1970), enacting OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5733.05.
62 Id., enacting OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5745.02-.03.
63 Id., enacting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (G).
654 Id., enacting OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (C).
65 Id., enacting OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01(D).
66 Id., enacting OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (G).
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lect revenues in excess of an amount equal to $75 multiplied by the
number of its inhabitants.67
Under the bill, only the state is permitted to tax business in-
come. But even though the business income tax would formally
be contained in the statutory chapter dealing with the franchise tax," '
it would still comport with article XII, section 8 of the constitution
and return not less than 50 percent of the tax to the county, school
district, city, village, or township in which the tax arose.69
If Ohio enacts a comprehensive state income tax, or any income
tax on sources now taxed by the municipalities, the statute should
contain a provision negating, or at least limiting, application of the
judicial doctrine of implied preemption, 0 since the doctrine is too
well established to expect any judicial relief 7' The municipal in-
come tax has become an important and effective source of revenue for
many citiesY2 It should not be sacrificed unnecessarily.
III. PROGREssivE TAXATION
Ohio municipalities tax two sources of income: gross personal
service compensation of individuals and net profits of businesses.
This section will propose a new statutory rate structure for taxing
personal service compensation. The rate structure is not meant to
apply to the business income of individuals. Thus, when the term
taxpayer is used in this section, it refers only to individuals paying
taxes on personal service compensation.
The Uniform Act requires that municipalities tax at a uniform
rate and prohibits exemptions to individuals being taxed on personal
service income.7 The preclusion of graduated rates makes the tax
proportional because all taxpayers, regardless of their income, have
to pay the same flat percentage rate.74 But although high and low
income taxpayers give up the same percentage of their incomes, the
671d., enacting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (E).
68 Id., enacting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5783.12 (B).
69 See note 57 supra & accompanying text.
7
o See Glander, supra note 46, at 362.
7 1 See, e.g., East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Akron, 7 Ohio St. 2d 73, 218 N.E.2d 608
(1966).
7 2 See notes 11-15 supra & accompanying text.
73 OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page Supp. 1970).
7 4 Taxes are usually classified and defined as follows: "1. A tax is progressive if its
rate increases as the tax base increases.... 2. A regressive tax is one whose rate dedlines
as the tax base increases.... 3. A tax is proportional when its rate remains the same,
regardless of the size of the tax base." C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES,
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 156 (2d ed. 1960).
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utility of that percentage to the latter is much greater. Thus, it has
been stated that a flat rate tax has some regressive aspects.75 At
present, the flat rate tax has not overburdened the low income tax-
payer because the tax rate is usually low76 - most Ohio municipal
income taxes are 1 percent or less.77 But if municipalities are per-
mitted to tax individual wage earners at a significantly higher rate
than the present 1 percent because of an increase in the Uniform
Act's ceiling, there will be a much greater impact on the low income
taxpayers. Thus, a system of taxation which provides for an equit-
able distribution of the tax burden is in order.
To properly determine what constitutes an equitable tax structure,
it is necessary to consider some basic principles of taxation. The
first, the equity principle, holds that taxpayers in reasonably similar
situations should be treated similarly.78 In this context classification
by income level has been widely accepted. 79  The second, the ability
to pay principle, is a corollary of the first."' It provides a rough
guideline as to how the classification ought to be made. It recog-
nizes that, as a rule, the higher an individual's income, the greater
ability he has to pay the tax. The most sophisticated justification
of the ability to pay principle is the concept of minimum aggregate
sacrifice. Based on the assumption that individual satisfaction or
utility is measurable and is comparable among separate individuals
within a group, the concept states that the marginal utility of income
declines as the level of income increases. 81
A third principle of taxation is the benefits received principle.8
2
According to this principle, the individual receives certain tangible
and intangible benefits from the taxing sovereignty which justify
imposition of the tax. It can be argued that a person derives two
basic benefits from the municipality (or municipalities) in which he
lives and works. First, he receives numerous services, such as school-
ing, and fire and police protection. Second, the municipality pro-
vides services to his place of employment or business. Although
the place of employment is the direct recipient of these services, the
individual taxpayer indirectly benefits through the job opportunity
75 Note, supra note 5, at 1317 n.26.
76 Masotti & Kugelman, supra note 12, at 120; Walker, supra note 10, at 7.
77 See 2 CCH STATE TAX REP., OHIO 5 71-150, at 7021 to 7044 (1970).
78 J. BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 182-84.
79 See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1.
80 J. BUCHANAN, supra note 10, at 184-87.
81 Id. at 185.
82 C. McCONNELL, supra note 74, at 155.
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made possible by the municipality. And if the ability to receive in-
come is thus considered a benefit derived from the municipality, then
the level of individual income can be used to measure the benefit
received.
The above principles point to a progressive tax as the most equit-
able. A tax is progressive if its rate increases as the tax base in-
creases. Thus, a progressive income tax imposes a higher tax rate
on individuals with high incomes than on individuals with low in-
comes. A progressive tax is generally considered equitable because
it imposes a greater burden on those people with a lower marginal
utility in their income. 3
For ease of administration and collection, the progressive tax
must be graduated. Taxpayers must be grouped and classified by
income ranges or brackets. With a graduated, progressive tax rate
the largest collections would still be made from the greatest revenue
source - the middle range incomes - but the largest proportional
rates would be levied on the highest incomes.
Even though a progressive tax effects a more equitable distribu-
tion of the tax burden than a uniform rate, it may still be unwise
to impose the tax at the lower income levels. For people at some
income levels, any tax burden at all is too onerous.84 In addition,
administrative expenses may be lessened by exempting the lower in-
come levels from the tax. Very often, people with low incomes are
either self-employed or perform temporary services for more than
one employer. Thus, they have not been subject to a regular tax
withholding. At the end of the tax year they are likely to lack the
cash to pay the tax, and the administrative costs of recovering these
unpaid taxes are often more than the amount to be collected.
The General Assembly appears to be authorized to amend the
Uniform Act to allow progressive rates and exemptions under either
one of the constitutional provisions which authorized the enactment
of the Act.85 In addition, article XII, section 8 provides:
8 3 J. BUCHANN, supra note 10, at 185.
8 4 
"It would be very difficult to administer an income tax that subjected all incomes
to tax. And, ethically, the taxation of the lowest incomes has been ruled out on the
argument that a certain existence minimum is necessary for human survival." Id. at 285.
85These are OHIo CONsT. art. XVIII, § 13; id. art. XIII, § 6. See note 30 supra.
Exemptions from a municipal income tax had been upheld in Ohio, against a charge
of a denial of equal protection, prior to the enactment of the Uniform Act. City of
Springfield v. Kenney, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 123, 104 N.E.2d 65 (Clark County Ct. App.
1951).
The Kenney case concerned the Springfield income tax, which excluded from taxa-
tion all persons with an annual income of $1,040 or less, but did not grant the exemption
to those whose income was more than the minimum. The court noted that taxing the
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Laws may be passed providing for the taxation of incomes, and
such taxation may be either uniform or graduated, and may be ap-
plied to such incomes as may be designated by law; but a part of
each annual income not exceeding three thousand dollars may be
exempt from such taxation.
Although this section ostensibly authorizes the legislature to enact a
state income tax, it, at the very least, demonstrates the absence of a
constitutional policy against progressive rates and exemptions."'
The principle argument against a progressive tax is that the in-
creased administrative costs87 in relation to revenue yield will out-
weigh its equitable advantages.88 Thus, the flat rate tax is justified
because of its ease of collection. 9 Most income taxes, however, are
withheld at the taxpayer's place of employment." Therefore, most
added collection burdens caused by the progressive rate will fall on
employers, whose payroll departments have dealt with progressive
rates in the federal income tax area for years. The use of tax tables
and mechanized payrolls91 can minimize any added burdens caused
excluded group would increase the costs of administering the tax approximately 30 per-
cent, while the additional amount collected would produce little if any additional rev-
enue. Thus, the court found that the classification was not artificial, arbitrary, or unrea-
sonable.
In Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937), the Supreme
Court upheld, against equal protection and due process challenges, the exemptions of
certain employers from an Alabama statute requiring employers to pay a tax, based on a
percentage of their monthly payrolls, into the state unemployment compensation fund.
The Kenney and Carmichael cases involved exemptions which were only granted
to a certain class or classes of taxpayers. The exemption provision which this Note
suggests adding to the Uniform Act would apply to every individual subject to the tax.
Thus, it is doubtful whether an equal protection argument could even be seriously
raised. No classification would be involved. Individuals below a certain income level
would not have to pay any taxes, but individuals paying taxes would not be taxed on the
exempted portion of their income. For example, assuming a $2,000 exemption, an in-
dividual earning $2,000 would not be taxed, but an individual earning $5,000 would
only be taxed on $3,000. It is hard to find any discrimination between taxpayers in this
kind of situation.
88The allowance of exemptions would make the proposed tax truly progressive be-
cause those with very low incomes would not have to pay any tax. Whether a municipal
exemption should be as high as the $3,000 constitutional limit for state income taxes
would depend on the revenue needs of the municipality. See Fordham & Mallison, supra
note 30, at 252-53. See also Masotti & Kugelman, supra note 12, at 121, which cites the
old Warren, Ohio municipal income tax plan which granted a flat rate exemption of
$1,200 to all personal taxpayers.
87 Presently, administrative costs range from 2 to 5 percent of the total collections.
Gotherman, supra note 4, at 7.
88 See Note, supra note 59, at 275.
89 See, e.g., Note, supra note 5, at 1317.
90 R. SIGAFOOS, supra note 7, at 53.
91 Sigafoos, The Stake of Business in the Growing Municipal Income Tax Move-
ment, in STATE AND LOCAL TAXES ON BusiNEss 113, 119-20 (Tax Institute of Amer-
ica ed. 1965).
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by the greater complexity of a progressive tax. Moreover, the same
increase in the rate ceiling that will make a more equitable tax struc-
ture necessary will produce enough additional revenue to absorb any
increase in administrative costs without significantly depleting that
additional revenue. 2
This Note will not attempt to recommend a precise rate of taxa-
tion. Its purposes are only to suggest that greater flexibility in in-
creasing municipal income taxes would help the larger municipal-
ities meet their increasing financial burdens and to urge that this
flexibility entail an equitable distribution of the tax burden. A pro-
gressive rate structure which would allow Ohio municipalities -to
exempt incomes at least to the $3,000 constitutional level provides
such a distribution. Presently, three of the nine states which allow
their municipalities to enact an income tax have authorized a pro-
gressive local income tax of some form in their enabling acts.9
IV. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF
EARNED INCOME
Ohio municipal ordinances are remarkably uniform in classify-
ing the kinds of income subject to the tax. This uniformity is not
the result of a statutory classification imposed by the Uniform Act.
The Act does not attempt to define the term income, nor does it
classify or significantly limit the income which a municipality may
taxY4 Rather, the uniformity seems to stem from the various munic-
ipalities patterning their ordinances after one another.9 5 Basically,
92 But ef. Note, supra note 59, at 276-77.
93 Maryland allows each county and the city of Baltimore to tax residents' income at
a rate of not less than 20 percent nor more than 50 percent of their state income tax
liability. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 283 (Supp. 1970). Because the state personal in-
come tax is progressive, the piggyback county tax is also. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 288
(1969). For a listing of the Maryland counties that have enacted a tax and the rates in
each county, see CCH STATE TAX GUIDE 9 15-513, at 1577-5 (1970). New York City
has adopted a progressive rate patterned after the Internal Revenue Code. N.Y. GEN.
CITY LAW §§ 25(a), 25(m) (McKinney 1968); CCIH STATE TAX GUIDE 9 15-691,
at 1593-2 to 1593-5 (1970). Wilmington, Delaware has recently levied a progressive
tax which includes an exemption for incomes less than $4,000 per year. CCH STATE
TAX GUIDE 9 15-319.1, at 1562 (1970).
94 The Uniform Act does prohibit taxation of military pay and allowances, and
income from the tax exempt property and activities of religious, fraternal, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational institutions. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page
Supp. 1970).
There is no Ohio constitutional definition of "taxable income." OHIO CONST. art.
XII, § 8, provides in part: "Laws may be passed providing for the taxatition of incomes
... and may be applied to such incomes as may be designated by law...."
95 The Ohio Municipal League has an active committee on uniform procedures for
municipal income taxes. The committee has drafted a model income tax ordinance and
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municipalities tax what is known as earned income. 6 The earned
income taxed comes from two sources: gross personal service com-
pensation of individuals and net profits of businesses. 7
Most Ohio municipalities include as taxable income all wages,
commissions, and other personal service compensation paid to em-
ployees or agents for services rendered. 8  Although cities and vil-
lages are authorized by the Uniform Act to permit all "lawful deduc-
tions as prescribed by ordinance,"9 9 most municipalities have chosen
to tax the gross compensation income of the taxpaying individual.
Several cities in other states, including New York and Baltimore,
allow deductions patterned on the Internal Revenue Code,00 justify-
ing them on the ground that it makes the tax - whether flat rate
or progressive - more progressive and equitable. 1°1 But the admin-
istrative problems that arise when deductions are allowed may out-
weigh their usefulness. The process of calculating the adjusted
gross incomes of individual taxpayers would become a difficult and
time-consuming task. Although the taxpayer's place of employ-
ment could still withhold a certain standard amount of tax, there is
no assurance that this would be the correct amount. The deductions
would vary from employee to employee. Thus, municipalities
would have to examine the validity of the deductions claimed and
become involved in the complex process of calculating and remitting
refunds. These added administrative functions would nullify one
of the most important benefits of the municipal income tax - the
efficiency of its operation.
In taxing the earned income of businesses, Ohio municipalities tax
only the net profits of corporations, professionals, unincorporated
businesses, partnerships, and self-employed persons which are attrib-
uniform rules and regulations, both of which have been widely accepted throughout the
state. See Gotherman, supra note 4, at 8.
9 6 See 3 J. FARRELL, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE 357 (11th ed. 1962).
97 Another lucrative source of income, albeit "unearned" income, is capital gains. At
present, Michigan municipalities and New York City tax capital gains, but Pennsylvania
and Ohio municipalities do not. OHIO TAX STUDY COMM'N, supra note 56, at 324
(1967). It has been urged that capital gains would not come within the state pre-
emption doctrine set forth in Ohio Finance Co. v. City of Toledo, 163 Ohio St. 81,
125 N.E.2d 731 (1955), where the court stated that the state intangibles tax preempted
Ohio municipalities from taxing investment income (see text accompanying notes 47-52
supra). See 3 J. FARRELL, supra note 96, at 358.
08 For the texts of the Ohio municipal tax ordinances, see 2 CCH STATE TAX REP.,
OHIO 5 97-507 to 99-307 (1970).
99 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page Supp. 1970).
10 0 See MD. CODE ANN. art. 81, §§ 281, 286 (1969); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §
25a(12) (McKinney 1968). See also Note, supra note 5, at 1322.
101 R. SIGAFOOS, supra note 7, at 109.
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utable to their doing business within the munidpality.1 2 For situa-
tions where a business operates both within and without the munici-
pality, the Uniform Act provides methods of allocating a portion of
the business' net profits to the taxing municipality."0 3
The first, and least common, is the "separate accounting" method
of allocation.0 4 Under this method, the taxpayer's books and rec-
ords must disclose with reasonable accuracy that portion of the busi-
ness' or professional's net profits which can be allocated to ac-
tivities within the boundaries of the municipal corporation. One
problem with this method is that there is no authoritative interpre-
tation of the phrase "with reasonable accuracy." On its face, it seems
to indicate that the taxpayer must keep a separate set of books which
explicitly spell out where all expense and income items originate.
Because of the added expense of these separate bookkeeping proce-
dures, the separate accounts method is seldom used even by busi-
nesses which conduct almost all of their operations in the taxing
municipality.
The second, and most common, method of net profit allocation
is the statutory formula method. The Uniform Act provides a pre-
cise, although somewhat arbitrary, three-factor formula to determine
the percentage of the total net profits of the taxpayer which should
be allocated to business conducted within the municipality. This
formula, commonly known as the "Massachusetts formula," is na-
tionally the most frequently used allocation formula at both the
state and local levels.'0 5 Basically, the business makes the following
calculations: (1) it determines the ratio of the net book value of its
real and tangible personal property located within the municipality
to its total real and tangible personal property; (2) it determines
the ratio of the total wages, salaries, and other compensation paid
to personnel for services performed within the municipality to the
total compensation paid by the business in the taxable period; and
(3) it determines the ratio of the gross receipts from business done
102 The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that municipalities may tax income derived
from real estate rentals as net profits. Benua v. City of Columbus, 170 Ohio St. 64, 162
N.B.2d 467 (1959). In Benua, the court, through Judge Peck, stated that the tax was on
profits earned from' the property; it was not a tax on ownership of the property. Pre-
sumably, municipalities may tax rental income whether or not the lessor is engaged in
the business of renting real estate or actively furnishes services for the tenants. See 3 J.
FARRELL, supra note 96, at 359.
203 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 718.02 (Page 1964).
104 Id. See generally, Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate Income for State
Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 84, 85 (1957).
105 See Glander, supra note 21, at 496; Lynn, supra note 104, at 89; Note, supra note
5, at 1331.
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within the municipality during the taxable period to the total gross
receipts of the firm from all business conducted during that period.
These percentages are averaged and the business' total net profit is
multiplied by the resulting percentage to determine the attributable
net profit.'016 If this formula produces inequitable results, an alter-
nate formula, to be prescribed by uniform state regulations, may be
used. Thus far, however, no such regulations have been promul-
gated. Formulas fairly apportioning net income have been upheld
against charges that they violate the interstate commerce and due
process clauses of the federal constitution." 7 A formula will be
struck down only if a business can show that in its application it is
a wholly unreasonable means of allocating net profits to operations
within the municipality. 0 8
Municipal classification of earned income according to source -
gross personal service compensation of individuals and net profits
of businesses - was upheld in 1954 by the United States Supreme
Court in Walters v. City of St. Louis.10 9 In that case, the petitioners,
who were individual salaried employees, contended that the classifica-
tion deprived them of equal protection and due process because a self-
employed person would enjoy a tax advantage (net profits versus
gross salary) over a salaried employee engaged in the same occupa-
tion. In rejecting this contention, the Court noted that such tax-
payers are not engaged in precisely the same form of activity be-
cause the salaried employee, who only works for the business enter-
106 One commentary states that city-to-city variations in the definition of each factor
of the formula may produce a lack of uniformity in the application of this tax to a firm
that does business in several cities. See Note, supra note 5, at 1331. Although the
amount of actual tax liability will not vary greatly, the increased administrative costs to
the corporation are unnecessary and could be avoided under uniform definitions.
107 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
See also United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918) (the first
case upholding a fair apportionment formula). The application of a fair apportionment
formula to individuals doing an interstate business has been held not to violate the priv-
ileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37
(1920).
108 Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
The apportionment method has produced several abberations that have been upheld.
For example, in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberland, 254 U.S. 113 (1920), use
of a separate accounting method showed that only $43,000 of the company's $1.3 mil-
lion in net profits was received in Connecticut. Yet the apportionment method used,
which was based on the ratio of the company's real and personal property within the
state to its total property, allocated 47 percent of the company's net income to the state.
The tax was upheld because the company did not show that the amount of net income
was not reasonably attributable to its processes conducted within the state.
109 347 U.S. 231 (1954). Such a classification was found valid in Ohio prior to
the Walters case. City of Springfield v. Krichbaum, 88 Ohio App. 329, 100 N.E.2d
281 (Clark County Ct. App. 1950) (per curiam).
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prise, does not directly share in the risks of the business. Thus, the
Court found that the municipality had a rational basis for the classi-
fication. There is a real difference between wage or salary income,
which is relatively fixed and predictable, and the profits of a busi-
ness, which are usually fluctuating and unstable. The Court did not
challenge the legislative wisdom of the municipality's method of
collecting tax revenues. It merely found that the classification was
based on a real differentiation and that this differentiation bore a
reasonable relationship to the purpose of the taxing ordinance.""
Although municipalities may thus constitutionally classify sources
of income, can they tax the sources at different rates? Can a munic-
ipality constitutionally tax the net profits of businesses at a high flat
rate and the gross personal service compensation of individuals at
a progressive rate?
In Ohio, any classification of income sources must be of the Wal-
ters business-nonbusiness type in order to comply with Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. City of Youngstown.'1 ' In that case, the city of
Youngstown levied a tax of 0.3 percent on the gross personal service
compensation of employees who either lived or worked within the
city and the net profits attributable to the city of unincorporated as-
sociations, proprietorships, and partnerships. A tax of 1 percent
was levied against the corporate net profits attributable to the city.
In an action to enjoin the collection of the tax, the Court of Appeals
for Mahoning County affirmed the grant of an injunction, holding
that such a classification violated the equal protection clauses of the
Ohio and Federal Constitutions. A proprietorship and a corporation
that were competing in the same field and receiving revenue from
identical sources would suffer different tax consequences solely be-
cause of their incorporated or unincorporated status." 2 The court
found that there was no reasonable basis for this distinction.
In the Youngstown case, the court was primarily concerned with
the city's unreasonable classification of taxpayers rather than the
different tax rates imposed. If the challenged classification had been
110 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion stating that under the proposed
St. Louis rules, not under consideration in the Walters case because they had not become
effective, employers would be allowed a deduction for state and federal taxes paid, but
employees would not. This situation, Mr. Justice Douglas stated, would raise a serious
equal protection problem. See Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 23& (1954).
ill91 Ohio App. 431, 108 N.E.2d 571 (Mahoning County Ct. App. 1951).
112 Such a classification was struck down in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,
277 U.S. 389 (1928). In that case, a Pennsylvania statute taxed the gross receipts of
corporations operating taxicabs, but did not tax unincorporated associations engaged in
the same business. The Court found that the classification violated the equal protection
clause.
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between individual employees and businesses, the different rates
would probably have been upheld. As long as there is a rational
basis for the classification, as there was in Walters, different tax
treatment should not violate the equal protection clause.
But is it in the best interest of municipalities to tax the net
profits of businesses at a high flat rate? For example, will this
method of taxation have a substantial effect on a business' decision
on where to locate or relocate within the state, or whether to locate
within the state at all?
A business which has established itself in a community is not
likely to move because of an increase in the municipal income tax.
Assuming that other factors remain the same, the cost and incon-
venience of relocation would far exceed any increased tax burden.
The rate of a municipal income tax assumes more significance for
a business deciding where to initially locate within a state or whether
to locate within the state at all. But the tax rate will only be one
consideration among many. A few of the more important considera-
tions are the property tax structure, the availability of skilled man-
power, and proximity to resources. In addition, most industrialized
areas tax businesses to some degree.1 ' Thus, the income tax rate
is likely to be a minor consideration even in the initial location de-
cision.
An additional argument has been made that a municipality's rate
of business taxation will have very little effect on a business' choice
of location because the tax revenue is used to provide the benefits
and services that the business desires. The larger the tax, the more
services the municipality will be able to provide. Also, the business
will reap an indirect reward by being able to attract and retain per-
sonnel who are attracted by the municipality." 4  This reasoning is
questionable, however, at a time when most large cities, and even
some smaller cities, need increased revenue just to make ends meet.
V. TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS
A. Residency
Ohio municipalities tax individuals on their gross personal service
11 See ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LO-
CAL TAXES table 16, at 49 (1968), which lists the state corporate income tax rates as of
January 1, 1968 for 42 states and the District of Columbia. The rates vary from
Arkansas' I percent on the first $3,000 to Minnesota's 11.33 percent. The median tax
for all states was between 4 and 5 percent.
114 See, e.g., Bahl, State Taxes, Expenditures and the Fiscal Plight of the Cities, in
THE STATES AND THE URBAN CRISIS 85, 96 (A. Campbell ed. 1970).
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income. These individual taxpayers can be divided, on the basis of
residency, into three categories: residents who both live and work
within the municipality, residents who work outside the municipality,
and nonresidents who work within the municipality. The issue has
arisen whether the municipality is justified in taxing individuals
in each of these catagories on the same basis.
A major justification for the imposition of a municipal income
tax upon any given individual is the benefits of protection, services,
and employment opportunities which the individual receives from
the municipality. Clearly, all of these benefits attach to an individual
who both resides and works in the municipality. But the nonresi-
dent employed within the municipality and the resident employed
outside the municipality receive only a portion of these benefits.
The question thus arises whether the latter individuals may be
taxed in the same way as the person who both resides and works in
the municipality. More specifically, has a person who receives only
a portion of the benefits but who pays the same taxes as one who
receives all of the benefits been deprived of his property without due
process of law?
Perhaps the easier situation to justify is that of the resident of
the taxing municipality who works outside the municipality. A 1965
Ohio Supreme Court decision, Thompson v. City of Cincinnati 15 reaf-
firmed earlier lower court cases" 6 which had held that such a resident
shares sufficiently in the services and protection of the municipality
to justify imposition of the tax. Whether a tax violates the due
process clause is determined by its fiscal relationship to the benefits
given to the taxpayer by the municipality. In other words, has the
municipality given something for which it can ask a return?"17 But
the specific benefits in which the taxpayer participates are not the basis
for the amount of tax he pays. By merely choosing his domicile and
using the services it provides, the taxpayer establishes a sufficient fiscal
relationship for the full imposition of the tax.
The more difficult situation to justify is that of the nonresident
employed within the taxing jurisdiction." 8  The Ohio courts have
115 2 Ohio St. 2d 292,208 N.B.2d 747 (1965).
116 See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Kurtz, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 593, 104 N.E.2d 64
(Clark County Ct. App. 1951); City of Springfield v. Kenney, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 123,
104 N.E.2d 65 (Clark County Ct. App. 1951); City of Springfield v. Krichbaum, 88
Ohio App. 329, 100 N.E.2d 281 (Clark County Ct. App. 1950) (per curiam).
117 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); see Comment, Munici-
pal Personal Income Taxation of Nonresidents, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 770, 778 (1970).
118 In Arnold v. Berra, 366 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1963), the Supreme Court of Missouri
upheld St. Louis' municipal income tax, when applied to an individual who worked in
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uniformly held that such nonresidents enjoy sufficient benefits from
the municipality to justify imposition of the full amount of the tax.
The first case to uphold the municipal income tax in Ohio, Angell v.
City of Toledo," 9 involved such a nonresident. The plaintiff, Angell,
was not a resident of Toledo but was employed by a business located
within its municipal boundaries. The Angell court did not focus at
length upon the nonresident issue; it merely noted that there was a
sufficient fiscal relationship between the taxpayer and the protections,
opportunities, and benefits given by the municipality to justify im-
position of the tax. The protection and services were direct benefits
to the plaintiff's employer's place of business, and the plaintiff, as
an employee, was an indirect recipient of these benefits. The court
concluded that the municipality afforded the nonresident employee
not only a place of work, but a place of work that was protected by
the municipal government.
In McConnell v. City of Columbus,'2 the Supreme Court of Ohio
examined the nonresident issue more closely and reaffirmed the hold-
ing of Angell. In McConnell the plaintiff was a nonresident employed
at Ohio State University in the city of Columbus. He sued for a de-
claratory judgment and injunction against the collection of Colum-
bus' municipal income tax. He alleged that the tax as applied to
himself and all others similarly situated violated the due process
clause of the 14th amendment because there was not a sufficient fiscal
relationship between himself and the municipality to authorize impo-
sition of the tax. McConnell also alleged that the tax was an
unjustified interference by a lesser government with the affairs of a
superior government because he worked for Ohio State University,
which is a direct instrumentality of the state government.'21
St. Louis but lived in Illinois, against the charge that the tax was an undue burden on
interstate commerce.
119 153 Ohio St. 179,91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
120 172 Ohio St. 95, 173 N.E.2d 760 (1961).
121 In Ohio, the argument cannot be raised, as it has been in other states, that the
city may not tax a state employee because the city is merely a creature of the state. As
the Angell and State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919),
cases conclusively established, the power of taxation is a power of local self-government
under article XVIII, section 3 of the constitution. The state possesses constitutional au-
thority to limit the ability of municipalities to levy taxes (OHIO CONST. art. XIII, §
6; id. art. XVIII, § 13; see note 30 supra), but it has not exempted state employees from
municipal taxation.
In 1967, however, the General Assembly added the following to the Uniform Act:
"No municipal corporation other than the city of residence shall levy a tax on the in-
come of any member or employee of the Ohio general assembly... which income is re-
ceived as a result of services rendered as such member or employee and is paid from
appropriated funds of this state." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.04 (Page Supp. 1970).
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In holding against the plaintiff on both claims, the court pointed
out the numerous services that the municipality performed for the
University, both on and off the campus. The court viewed the Uni-
versity not as an island unto itself within the jurisdiction of Colum-
bus, but as a place of work protected by the Columbus municipal
government and within the jurisdiction of that government. Turn-
ing to the interference argument, the court noted that the tax in
question was a nondiscriminatory tax on income earned for services
rendered. As such, it did not represent a substantial or undue threat
to or interference with the activities of another governmental
branch.1
22
In McConnell, the city of Columbus was required by statute to
provide certain services for the University. But even if the city had
not been required to directly provide any services to the University,
the location of that institution within the boundaries of the city might
have been a sufficient incident for the tax. In City of Cincinnati v.
Faig,123 the Cincinnati Municipal Court held that a nonresident em-
ployee of a federal facility in Cincinnati was accountable for that
city's income tax, even though the city did not directly provide ser-
vices to the facility.'2 The Faig court found a sufficient connection
between the taxpayer and the city's services. The employee traveled
over municipal streets to and from his place of work, and he could
rely on police protection while within the city. The court also found
contingent benefits because it was possible that in the future the city
might furnish police and fire protection to the federal area on a
regular or emergency basis.
122 The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity from income taxes at the state and
federal levels has been well diluted through such Supreme Court decisions as Helvering
v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (upholding application of the federal income tax to
employees of the Port of New York Authority, an agency of New York and New Jer-
sey) and Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (upholding New
York's income tax as applied to an employee of Home Owners' Loan Corporation, a
wholly owned instrumentality of the United States Government), overruling Collector
v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
In the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-10 (Supp. V 1970), Congress has set out specific
provisions governing taxation of federal employees.
123 77 Ohio L. Abs. 449, 145 N.E.2d 563 (Cincinnati Mun. Ct. 1957), overruled on
other grounds, City of Akron v. Smith, 14 Ohio St. 2d 247, 237 N.E.2d 396 (1968).
124 The plaintiff also raised the intergovernmental immunity argument that he did
not have to pay the tax because he was an employee of the federal government. The
Faig court rejected the argument on solid authority. See Howard v. Commissioners of
the Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624 (1953); Kiker v. City of Philadelphia, 346 Pa. 624,
31 A.2d 289 (1943).
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B. Reciprocity
An almost inevitable result of a municipality's ability to impose
its income tax on nonresidents is the double taxation situation. This
situation occurred in Thompson v. City of Cincinnati.' The plaintiff,
Thompson, was a resident of the city of Loveland and was employed
in Cincinnati. Both Loveland and Cincinnati imposed a municipal
income tax. But Loveland, unlike Cincinnati, did not allow a deduc-
tion to its residents for income taxes they had to pay on their wages
because of work performed outside the city. The plaintiff asserted
that he was being subjected to two taxes, while residents of Cin-
cinnati who worked in Loveland were only being subjected to one
tax. Such a taxing scheme, the plaintiff claimed, not only violated
his right to equal protection of the law, but also violated the Uni-
form Act's prohibition against a municipality's taxing incomes "at
a rate in excess of one percent," without electorate approval.'26 He
claimed that the 1 percent ceiling should not apply separately to
each community. Rather, it should apply to the combined taxes of
all the communities which could lawfully impose a tax on his income.
The Court of Common Pleas for Hamilton County held that the
city of Loveland had no authority to" collect its tax.2 7 The court of
appeals affirmed and the supreme court reversed. The supreme court
stated that the provision of the Uniform Act requiring 55 percent
electorate approval before a municipality can tax income at a rate in
excess of 1 percent 28 applied only to individual communities, not
to the combined taxes of two or more communities. The court
emphasized the plain meaning of the statute's reference to munic-
ipality in the singular. It also rejected the argument that the 1 per-
cent ceiling reflected a legislative intent to limit an individual's mu-
nicipal income tax liability to 1 percent.
In discussing the equal protection claim that there was an
unlawful discrimination between the Cincinnati resident who worked
in Loveland and was allowed a deduction for the taxes paid in Love-
land and the Loveland resident who worked in Cincinnati and was
allowed no such deduction, the court stated that certain deductions
were a matter of local policy for the municipality. Although the
125 Thompson v. City of Cincinnati, 2 Ohio St. 2d 292, 208 N.E.2d 747 (1965).
12 6 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page Supp. 1970).
127 93 Ohio L Abs. 11, 196 N.E.2d 349 (Hamilton County C.P. 1963).
12 8 When the Thompson case was decided the Uniform Act required 55 percent elec-
torate approval in a general election and 60 percent in a special election. A 1968
amendment to the Act reduced the required percentages to 50 and 55 percent respec-
tively. OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page Supp. 1970).
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Uniform Act provides that no municipal corporation shall exempt
any compensation for personal services of individuals over 18 years
of age, it also provides that "[n]othing in this section shall prevent
a municipal corporation from permitting lawful deductions as pre-
scribed by ordinance." '  The court reasoned that municipalities
may all tax up to the 1 percent limit, but the Uniform Act grants
them authority to allow deductions. Cincinnati chose to exercise
this authority and allow its residents a deduction for taxes paid in
another municipality. That the municipality where the plaintiff
lived did not choose to exercise this authority did not deny the
plaintiff equal protection of the laws.
The issues in the Thompson case became moot when the Love-
land tax was repealed by a vote of the electors. 8 0 But with the
widespread use of the municipal income tax in Ohio, similar double
taxation situations are bound to be common. Thus, Ohio munic-
ipalities have moved to protect their residents from the burden of
double taxation through the use of a credit system. Ohio munic-
ipalities allow a deduction or credit to their residents employed in
another municipality based on the taxes paid on their salaries in
the other municipality.' 8 ' The credit given is equal to the amount
of tax paid by the resident to the other municipality, but it cannot
exceed an amount which the resident municipality would levy on the
resident's income earned in the other jurisdiction. This "full
amount" credit system is practically universal among Ohio munic-
ipalities.1 2
The major problem created by the use of the credit system is the
loss of revenue to the resident communities. This problem has be-
come especially acute in suburban areas surrounding a large urban
core.'3 One solution to this problem has been a method of revenue
sharing, or reciprocity.' Reciprocity entails the municipality of
employment refunding a certain percentage of the tax collected to
the municipality where the taxpayer resides. In order for the system
to operate, both municipalities must impose a tax on personal in-
come earned in their jurisdictions. If the two municipalities have a
different rate of tax, an agreement must be worked out between
129 Id.
1'0 See Gotherman, supra note 4, at 9.
181d.
132 See 3 J. FAau3LL, supra note 96, at 364.
133 Cf. City of Aurora v. City of Bay Village, Civil No. 886, 995 (Cuyahoga County
C.P. Nov. 6, 1970).
134 See generally Gotherman, supra note 4, at 9.
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them as to which rate they will reciprocate. Municipalities in Ohio
have agreed to reciprocate on the lesser of the two rates.'35 Of the
274 Ohio municipalities which have taxing ordinances, 105 have
reciprocating provisions in their ordinances. Twenty-five of these,
located primarily in the Toledo-Maumee-Bowling Green area, share
on a 50-50 basis. The remaining 80, located principally in Cuya-
hoga County (the greater Cleveland area), share on a basis of 75
percent going to the city of employment and 25 percent going to the
city of residence.3 6
Reciprocity is exclusively a matter of mutual understanding be-
tween the municipalities. 37 There is no state statutory requirement
for revenue sharing, although there have been several proposals
before the General Assembly to require reciprocity. 138 The mutual
understanding is effected through respective municipal ordinances
containing identical language regarding refunds to the municipal-
ity of residence. One municipality may not require another to in-
dude reciprocity provisions in its taxing ordinance, and one munic-
ipality cannot stop another from cancelling reciprocal provisions in
a fair and equitable manner. Some indication of what is meant by
a fair and equitable manner of cancellation was given in the recent
case of City of Aurora v. City of Bay Village.139
The Aurora case grew out of Cleveland's unilateral repeal of its
reciprocity ordinance because of its urgent need for additional oper-
ating funds. The ordinance was repealed on September 2, 1970,
the repeal to take effect in 28 days. The Common Pleas Court for
Cuyahoga County granted injunctive relief to the plaintiff munic-
ipalities which reciprocated with Cleveland. The court voided Cleve-
land's repeal of its ordinance and enjoined it, until December 31,
1971, from failing to comply with its reciprocity obligations.
The Aurora court traced the 3-year history of cooperation and
mutual reliance between the municipalities involved in the reciproc-
ity plan. It found that Cleveland and the outlying municipalities in-
tended to establish, through their respective reciprocity ordinances, a
binding cooperative procedure which would last for a reasonable
135 Id.
13 6 See OHIO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, STATISTICS ON MUNICIPAL INCOME TAXES IN
OHIO (1967).
137 See Gotherman, supra note 4, at 9.
138 See, e.g., H.B. 446, 108th Gen. Ass'y Reg. Sess., § 1 (1969-1970), which would
have amended the Uniform Act to require a city of employment in the same or contiguous
county as the city of residence to refund "not less than twenty-five percent of the lesser of
the taxes imposed on the same income of such individual...."
139 Civil No. 886,995 (Cuyahoga County C.P. Nov. 6, 1970).
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period of time. In addition, the court noted that under Ohio law the
budgets of the various municipalities had to be approved on or be-
fore July 1 of each year for the following year, based upon antici-
pated revenues. When the municipalities formulated their budgets
for the 1970-1971 fiscal year, they justifiably relied upon the antici-
pated revenues they would receive through the reciprocity plan.
Cleveland's summary cancellation of its reciprocity ordinance would
deny the suburbs these anticipated revenues, placing a severe strain
on many budgets. In granting relief to the plaintiffs, the court did
not hold that there was no legal right to unilaterally repeal a reci-
procity ordinance. It only held that a municipality must give rea-
sonable notice before terminating its participation in a reciprocity
plan. The court indicated what it regarded as reasonable notice by
enjoining Cleveland from cancelling its reciprocity ordinance in the
future with less than 10 months notice. The Aurora decision demon-
strates that the right to cancellation is not unrestricted, but is subject
to equitable considerations.
Although the Aurora case illustrates a judicial attitude sympa-
thetic to the need for cooperation among communities, it also dem-
onstrates the vulnerability of a reciprocity system based upon "mu-
tual understanding." The unilateral repeal of a large municipality's
reciprocity ordinance can have a disasterous effect on numerous
smaller communities. Thus, the General Assembly should amend
the Uniform Act to prevent recurrences of Aurora-type situations.
A state imposed reciprocity system should attempt to recognize
that the three categories of taxpayers affected by a municipal income
tax do not receive equal benefits from the municipality. The indi-
vidual who both lives and works within a municipality receives 100
percent of the benefits the municipality offers and, of course, should
be subject to the full amount of the municipality's tax. But an in-
dividual who lives and works in different municipalities does not
receive 100 percent of the benefits of either municipality. Under
present credit and reciprocity systems, he pays the full amount of the
tax imposed by the municipality of employment. He receives a
credit for the tax paid, usually in the full amount, which he deducts
from his 100 percent tax liability in his city of residence. The city
of employment then refunds to the city of residence a designated
percentage of the taxes paid by the nonresident employee. This kind
of system gives no regard to the amount of benefits the taxpayer
receives from each municipality.
The following system would recognize that an individual cannot
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receive all of the benefits a municipality offers unless he both lives
and works within the municipality. The rates to be imposed under
this system should be determined by the legislature after careful
study, but for the purposes of this discussion, rates of 60 and 40
percent will be adopted. Under the proposed system, a municipality
would not be permitted to tax a nonresident employee at more than
40 percent of its full tax rate. It would not be permitted to tax a
resident who works elsewhere at more than 60 percent of its full
tax rate.
There would be no need for credits or reciprocity under this new
system. The savings in administrative costs would be offset to some
extent, however, by the probable inability of a municipality to have
the taxes owed to it by residents who work in other municipalities
withheld by the residents' employers.
The tax becomes much more equitable under the proposed system.
An individual whose municipality of employment levies a tax but
whose place of residence does not will only have to pay 40 percent
of the tax, hopefully an accurate measure of the benefits received.
Under present systems, he would have to pay 100 percent, the same
tax paid by those who both live and work in the taxing jurisdiction.
Under the proposed system, the nonresident taxpayer will always pay
less than under the present system unless both municipalities are
taxing at the same rate. For example, assume the municipality
of employment is taxing at 2 percent and the municipality of resi-
dence is taxing at 1 percent. Under the present system, the non-
resident employee will be liable for the full 2 percent tax levied
by the municipality of employment. Under the proposed system,
however, he will only have to pay an overall tax of 1.4 percent. This
is obviously more equitable because an individual should only have
to pay taxes in a municipality according to the benefits he receives
from it. If one municipality charges less for its benefits than another
(through a lower tax rate), the individual who receives part of the
benefits of each municipality should pay taxes at a rate which reflects
the differences in the prices of benefits.
VI. NONRESIDENT VOTING
The Uniform Act presently provides that a municipality may levy
a tax in excess of 1 percent if it obtains approval from 50 percent
"of the electors of such municipality" in a general or primary elec-
tion, or 55 percent of such electors in a special election. 40 If
140 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page Supp. 1970).
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the ceiling rate is raised, the Act should still retain the electorate
approval provisions for increases above the new ceiling. The prob-
lem discussed in this section is that of the nonresident employee who
is taxed in the city where he works, but is denied the right to vote
in an election for an increase in the rate of tax above the statutory
ceiling.141 Three recent Supreme Court cases, Kramer v. Union Free
School District,'4 Cipriano v. City of Houma,43 and City of Phoe-
nix v. Kolodziejski,'44 give some insight into such a nonresident's
claim that the refusal to allow him to vote in an election to in-
crease the rate ceiling is a denial of equal protection under the
14th amendment.
In Kramer, a resident bachelor challenged the constitutionality
of a New York statute which precluded otherwise qualified voters
from voting in annual school board elections unless they (1) owned
or rented taxable property within the school district, (2) were the
spouse of one who owned or rented qualified property, or (3) were
the parent or guardian of a child enrolled in the school system during
the preceeding year. The plaintiff, who lived with his parents, ful-
filled none of the statutory requirements but was otherwise qualified
to vote in state and federal elections. The state supported the ex-
clusion on the ground that it had the right to limit the franchise to
"those 'primarily interested in such elections.' "11
The Supreme Court, reversing a three-judge district court, 4
held that the plaintiff was entitled to vote. The Court conceded that
there may have been a rational basis for the exclusion because the
plaintiff had neither children nor property which would be influ-
enced by the school levy.' 47  But it stated that when a state is going
14 1 If the nonresident employee is also taxed in his municipality of residence, under
the existing credit systems his tax could only be increased by the election if the proposed
rate were higher than the rate presently imposed where he resides. He could argue, how-
ever, that even if his taxes would not increase under the proposed rate, the higher that
rate becomes, the greater the possibility that it will one day surpass the rate in his munic-
ipality of residence. If the taxing system proposed in this Note to replace credits and
reciprocity is adopted, the election will, of course, always result in an increase in the
nonresidentes tax liability.
142 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
143 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
144 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
145 395 U.S. at 631.
148 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
147 The earliest test of state Jaws under the 14th amendment was the "rational basis"
doctrine. Under this doctrine, state laws were presumed constitutional and would sur-
vive if the reviewing court found that the state had a rational basis for the dassification.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 637 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
19711
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22.309
to deny a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, it will be held
to a stricter standard. If the challenged statute grants the right to
vote in a limited purpose election to some otherwise qualified voters
and denies it to others, "the Court must determine whether the ex-
clusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.' 148
New York attempted to justify the exclusions on the grounds
that they limited the franchise to those "primarily interested" in the
election. The Court rejected this justification because, even assuming
that New York could legitimately limit the franchise to those pri-
marily interested or affected, the statute in question did not accom-
plish this purpose with sufficient precision to justify the denial of the
franchise. The Court stated: "Whether classifications allegedly limit-
ing the franchise to those resident citizens 'primarily interested'
deny those excluded equal protection of the laws depends, inter alia,
on whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less inter-
ested or affected than those the statute included."' 49  The Court
found that the New York classification included many people with a
remote and indirect interest in school affairs and excluded others
who had a distinct and direct interest.' 50
The compelling interest test used in Kramer was later applied
by the Court to two cases where otherwise qualified voters were
denied the franchise in certain elections because they did not own
real property. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 5' the Court held
that the denial of the franchise to resident nonproperty owners, who
were otherwise qualified voters, in elections on revenue bonds to
finance municipal utilities was a denial of equal protection because
nonproperty owners as well as property owners were substantially
affected by the issuance of the bonds. Practically all of the city's
residents were served by the utilities, and the revenue bonds were
to be paid out of the operations of the utilities, perhaps resulting in
an increase in rates which would have to be borne by property owners
and nonproperty owners alike. Thus, the Court found that the
148 395 U.S. at 627. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 1964).
149 395 U.S. at 632.
150 For example, the Court noted that Kramer resided with his parents in the school
district, paid federal and state taxes, and was affected by and interested in school board
decisions. On the other hand, a lessee in the same district who paid no federal or state
taxes and who was uninterested in the school board decisions could participate in the
election. Id. at 632 n.15.
151 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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voting classification was invalid because it failed to promote any
compelling state interest.
In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,5 2 a resident nonproperty
owner challenged a denial of his right to vote in an election on
general obligation bonds. Once again the Court held that restric-
tion of the franchise to "only otherwise qualified voters" who were
also real property taxpayers denied equal protection of the law to
nonproperty owners. The Court conceded that a general operating
bond was of a different nature than the utility revenue bond in
Cipriano. But it still found that the nonproperty owners would be
substantially affected by the outcome of the election. They partici-
pated in the public facilities and services to be funded by the bond.
In addition, if the bond issues failed, the revenue might have to be
obtained through local taxes that would affect nonproperty owners
as well as property owners. Nonproperty owners are likely to share
the burden of a portion of an increase in property taxes by having to
pay higher rents when the landlord "passes through" the increased
tax rates.
5 3
Kramer', Cipriano, and Kolodziejski all concerned residents of
the municipalities. The question arises whether the same test and
policy would apply to a nonresident denied the right to vote in an
election which could increase his income taxes. A recent decision
of the United States District Court for Arizona points to the con-
clusion that they would not. In Kollar v. City of Tucson, 54 the
plaintiffs, who were qualified electors of the county, did not re-
side in the city of Tucson, but were serviced by the Tucson water-
works system. They were denied the franchise in a water revenue
bond levy by a state statute which limited the vote to "qualified
electors of the municipality." The plaintiffs argued that they had a
substantial pecuniary interest in the election because it could result
in their having to pay higher rates or receiving less adequate service.
They brought an action in a three-judge district court to have the
Arizona statute declared unconstitutional and to have the results of
the election enjoined.
152 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
1 5 3 Mr. Justice Stewart dissented in both Kramer and Kologzieiski and concurred in
Cipriano. He found that the classification in Cipriano was wholly irrelevant, while the
classifications in Kramer and Kolodzieiski were founded on a rational basis. The crucial
distinction for Justice Stewart between Cipriano and Kolodziejski was that Cipriano
dealt with income-producing utilities that could pay for themselves, while in Kolodziej-
ski the municipal improvements were to be paid for by the taxpayers through property
taxes.
154 319 P. Supp. 482 (D. Ariz. 1970).
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The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim. It first decided that,
under Kramer, the municipalities had to show a compelling state in-
terest for the denial of the franchise. The court then found that the
plaintiff was not as substantially affected and directly interested as the
residents in the challenged bond election. It pointed out that under
Arizona law, the municipality had no obligation to provide nonresi-
dents with water, and nonresidents could not compel such service.
The nonresident water users were only in a contractual relationship
with the municipality. The court then held that
the necessity of a boundary restriction in municipal elections, rather
than some other less definite qualification, the generally greater
stake of residents in local elections, and the necessity to define the
electorate in advance of election date and to properly administer
the elections are sufficient compelling interests, in this instance, for
Arizona's limitation on an absolute right to vote.155
The exclusion of the plaintiffs was found to be necessary to achieve
the state's interests.
Notwithstanding the Kollar case, it is doubtful whether the Uni-
form Act's restriction of the vote to "electors of such municipality"' 56
is necessary to protect a compelling state interest. The State of Ohio
and its municipalities might attempt to justify the restriction on three
grounds: first, that it is necessary to define the electorate in advance
of the election; second, that it provides a definite and easily manage-
able qualification requirement; and third, that residents have a greater
interest in the outcome of the election because they benefit more from
the city's services and resources.
The Uniform Act's exclusion achieves the first two aims. Denial
of the vote to nonresidents results in an easily definable and manage-
able electorate which may be ascertained before the election.
It is questionable, however, whether the exclusion can be upheld
on the ground that residents have a greater interest in the election
because they benefit more from a municipality's services than a non-
resident. First, it can be argued that the real subject of the election
is the rate of taxation, rather than the services, which are an indirect
result of that rate. Thus, the nonresident employee has as direct an
interest in the election as the resident. Second, even if it is assumed
that the level of municipal services is the subject of the election, the
nonresident employee may benefit from these services as much as
many residents. It is far from clear, for example, who receives more
155 Id. at 485.
156 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 718.01 (Page Supp. 1970).
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of a municipality's benefits, the nonresident employee, or the resident
who works elsewhere. And if the opportunity to earn income is
considered a benefit of the municipality, the amount of income
earned can be a measure of that benefit. Under this reasoning,
the nonresident earning a large salary might have a greater interest
in the election than a resident earning a small salary elsewhere.
Thus, to uphold the Uniform Act's exclusion of nonresident
voters, a municipality will have to demonstrate a compelling state
interest in defining a manageable electorate in advance of the elec-
tion. Even if this is a compelling interest, however, the Act's exclu-
sion of nonresident voters is not necessary to achieve it. Nonresi-
dents employed within the jurisdiction are not an unmanageable
class. They come to the municipality regularly to work, and could
vote at their place of employment or a nearby polling booth. And
the class could be easily defined in advance of the election through
registration of its members at their places of employment.
The Uniform Act's exclusion of nonresident voters from elec-
tions to raise the rate ceiling may not withstand a challenge under
the equal protection clause. But rather than wait for such a chal-
lenge, the General Assembly, in amending the Act, should require
municipalities to allow nonresident taxpayers to vote in general or
special elections affecting the amount of their tax liability.
VII. CONCLUSION
The income tax has become an important source of revenue to
Ohio cities. This Note has attempted to suggest a few ways in
which the tax can be made a more effective, and more equitably struc-
tured, revenue source. The basic prerequisites for attaining this goal
are an increase in the maximum rate which can be levied without
direct voter approval, and a legislative check on the judicial doc-
trine of implied preemption. Once these proposals are adopted, the
way lies open for a more equitable distribution of the tax burden.
A progressive rate structure with exemptions can be adopted for
the taxation of individuals. A state-imposed system of taxation can
be established which will both obviate the need for credit and re-
ciprocity systems and will tax individuals in proportion to benefits re-
ceived. Finally, the taxpayer should be given the right to vote in any
election, wherever held, which might increase his tax liability.
DONALD J. NEWMAN
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